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ABSTRACTS
Indeterminate Sentence on Juvenile Offender: 
From the Perspective of Criminal Policy （2）
Tokikazu KONISHI
　In April 2014, the Juvenile Act of 1948 was partly revised in Japan. 
Through this revision, the provisions for indeterminate sentence on 
juvenile offender were significantly changed （e.g. maximum and 
minimum terms of this indeterminate sentence were raised from 10 and 5 
years to 15 and 10）.
　This paper is aimed at revisiting the indeterminate sentence on 
juvenile offender in the Japanese juvenile justice system.
　In the first part, the history of this indeterminate sentence is traced: 
from Elmira Reformatory at Elmira, New York in the 19th century, 
through the Japanese Juvenile Acts of 1922 and 1948 into which the 
indeterminate sentence was introduced, to the partial revision of the latter 
Act in 2014. The provisions for indeterminate sentence on juvenile 
offender virtually persisted almost unchanged for nearly 100 years, and 
moreover, some of the basic characteristics of this indeterminate sentence 
have been inherited, as idealized models, from the practices in Elmira 
Reformatory.
　I n t h e s e c o n d p a r t , w e r e c o n s i d e r t h e r a i s o n d’ê t r e o f t h e 
indeterminate sentence on juvenile offender in the current Japanese 
juvenile justice system. After reconfirming the existing negative 
evaluation of indeterminate sentence in itself, we examine various issues 
relating to the indeterminate sentence on juvenile offender, especially in 
Japanese court and prison. As a result, it is shown that the indeterminate 
sentence on juvenile offender fails to function properly in the current 
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Japanese juvenile justice system despite the partial legal revision stated 
above.
　Finally, I conclude that this indeterminate sentence has already lost its 
raison d’être. Alternatively, we need to introduce the determinate 
sentence on juvenile offender with possibility of much earlier parole than 
adult offender.
Unconstitutionality of the Article 750 Civil Code
forcing a married couple to choose a single surname （1）
Koji TONAMI
　This paper is a legal opinion, which criticizes the decision of the Tokyo 
District Court on May 25 2013, and was submitted to the Tokyo High 
Court on October 22 2013. Article 750 Civil Code describes that a 
husband and wife shall adopt the surname of the husband or wife in 
accordance with that which is decided at the time of marriage. Then, five 
people filed a lawsuit for damages against the government, claiming that 
Article 750 Civil Code forcing them to choose a single surname after 
marriage violated their constitutional rights. After the decision of dismiss 
by the Tokyo district Court, the plaintiffs appealed to the Tokyo High 
Court. At the trial, this paper was submitted to the Tokyo High Court.
　In this paper, I insist that the Court must review the unconstitutionality 
of the Article 750 per se, that the right not to be forced to change a 
surname must be recognized to be constitutional right as one kind of 
personality rights delivered from “the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” in Article 13 Constitution of Japan, and that Article 750 has currently 
turned out to be unconstitutional because the human dignity of the individual, 
especially of wife in this case, takes precedence currently to a marital unity.
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　On March 28 2014, the Tokyo High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
appeal without adopting my opinion. However, after plaintiffs’ final 
appeal to the Supreme Court was accepted, the third Petty Bench decided 
to transmit the case to the Grand Bench, which is composed of full 
members of 15 Justices. The Grand Bench appointed the date of oral 
argument on November 4 2015. It means that the Supreme Court may 
render possible decision that the Article 750 is unconstitutional.
